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GOVERNMENT MANDATED DRUG TESTING FOR WELFARE
RECIPIENTS: SPECIAL NEED OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITION?
Celia Goetzl

*

INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Congress passed major welfare reform legislation. It
signed into law the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“PRWORA”), which replaced the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”) program and created
1
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF"). TANF empha2
sizes moving recipients from “welfare to work” and specifically authorizes states to drug test welfare recipients and to sanction those
3
who test positive. In 1999, Michigan was the first state to implement
a suspicionless drug testing policy as a condition for receiving welfare
4
benefits. A district court struck down the policy on Fourth Amendment grounds, and the Sixth Circuit court ultimately divided, upholding the district court’s injunction and putting a temporary stop
5
6
to the policy. However, the constitutional issues remain undecided.
*

1
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3

4
5

J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2007, University of
Pennsylvania. Special thanks to Josh Garber for the topic idea and to Professor Kermit
Roosevelt III for his guidance and insightful feedback on drafts of this Comment.
See Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1135 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d, 309 F.3d
330 (6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003),
aff’d by an equally divided court, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
About TANF, OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/programs/tanf/about (last visited Mar. 20, 2013).
21 U.S.C. § 862b (2006) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, States shall not be
prohibited by the Federal Government from testing welfare recipients for use of controlled substances nor from sanctioning welfare recipients who test positive for use of
controlled substances.”); Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2011)
(Scriven, J.) (“Congress authorizes states to test welfare recipients for controlled substances and to sanction those who test positive.”).
Jordan C. Budd, Pledge Your Body for Your Bread: Welfare, Drug Testing, and the Inferior Fourth
Amendment, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 751, 754 (2009).
Id. at 754–55 (citing Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1134). However, Michigan again
proposed similar legislation, relatively recently. See Crystal Garcia, State Could Require Drug
Test to Receive Welfare, TIMES HERALD (Port Huron, Mich.), Dec. 30, 2011, at A1.
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Since 2007, members of Congress,7 well over half of the states, and
8
some U.S. territories have proposed similar legislation requiring
drug testing for welfare recipients as a condition of receiving public
9
10
assistance. Recently, Florida enacted such a statute. Soon thereafter, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) brought a case
challenging the law’s constitutionality under the Fourth Amend11
ment. A federal district court judge ordered the preliminary injunction necessary to suspend the policy, and the Eleventh Circuit af-

6
7

8

9

10

11

Budd, supra note 4, at 754–55.
In 2009, Congress introduced federal legislation requiring drug testing for all recipients
of federally funded public assistance. Budd, supra note 4, at 775. Federal legislation is
still on the table. See Adam Cohen, Drug Testing the Poor: Bad Policy, Even Worse Law, TIME
(Aug. 29, 2011), http://ideas.time.com/2011/08/29/drug-testing-the-poor-bad-policyeven-worse-law/ (“Senator David Vitter, a Louisiana Republican, has introduced the Drug
Free Families Act of 2011, which would require all 50 states to drug-test [sic] welfare applicants.”).
See Drug Tester, Guam Senator Pushes for Drug Testing of Welfare Recipients,
CONFIRMBIOSCIENCES (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.confirmbiosciences.com/blog/welfarerecipients-drug-testing/guam-senator-pushes-for-drug-testing-of-welfare-recipients.html
(discussing proposed legislation in Guam).
See Budd, supra note 4, at 774 (“[D]rug testing legislation appeared in over half of the
states by 2009.”); Associated Press, Growing Support for Drug Testing of Welfare, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2012, at A18 (“Nearly two dozen states are considering measures that would
make drug testing mandatory for welfare recipients, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures.”); Jim Lynch & Karen Bouffard, Welfare Recipients May Face Drug
Tests, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 29, 2011, at A1 (“Thirty-six states are considering testing laws
that would require urine sample testing for public assistance.”); A.G. Sulzberger, States
Adding Drug Test as Hurdle for Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2011, at A1 (“This year, 36 states
considered drug testing for recipients of case assistance from the major welfare program,
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families . . . .”).
See FLA. STAT. § 414.0652 (2011); see also Michael C. Bender, Scott Signs Bill Forcing Drug
Testing on Welfare Recipients, MIAMI HERALD (May 31, 2011), http://miamiherald.
typepad.com/nakedpolitics/2011/05/scott-signs-bill-forcing-drug-tests-on-welfarerecipients.html (“Floridians will have to submit urine, blood or hair samples for drug testing before receiving cash benefits from the state under a bill Gov. Rick Scott signed into
law . . . .”); Cohen, supra note 7 (“Under a new Florida law, people applying for welfare
have to take a drug test at their own expense.”).
Sulzberger, supra note 9, at A1 (“The law . . . provoked a lawsuit . . . from the American
Civil Liberties Union, arguing that the requirement represents an unreasonable search
and seizure.”).
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firmed the decision.12 But, the push for welfare recipient drug testing
13
legislation continues, in Florida and elsewhere.
Such policies stereotype, stigmatize, and criminalize the poor
14
without cause. Studies have shown that welfare recipients are no
15
more likely than the general population to abuse drugs, and drug
16
testing programs cost taxpayers significantly more than they save.
But, aside from bad policy, does drug testing in this context constitute an unlawful search under current constitutional doctrine?
Courts and commentators are applying a standard Fourth
Amendment analysis to the emerging laws. The Fourth Amendment
generally prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures without par17
ticularized suspicion or warrants. Under some circumstances, however, the “special needs” doctrine gives the government greater latitutde. Even without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, a search
may still be reasonable if the government can show that it is warrant12

13

14

15

16

17

See Lebron v. Wilkins, 829 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1281 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (“[T]here is a substantial likelihood that [plaintiff’s] challenge to the constitutionality of [the Florida statute]
under the Fourth Amendment will succeed.”), aff’d, Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, No. 11-15258, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 3998, at *44 (11th Cir. Feb. 26,
2013); Michael Mayo, Judge Makes Right Call in Halting Florida Welfare Drug Testing, SUNSENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Oct. 27, 2011, at 1B (discussing Florida district court
ruling).
Florida announced its intent to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court. See Arthur
Delaney, Florida Welfare Drug Testing Law Gets No Reprieve From Appeals Court, HUFFINGTON
POST (Feb. 26, 2013, 2:38PM, updated 3:06PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/02/26/florida-welfare-drug-testing_n_2766479.html. Georgia passed its own legislation on April 16, 2012. See 2012 Georgia Laws Act 583 (H.B. 861); Evan Beauchamp &
Andrew Hazen, Social Services, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 224, 232 (2012) (legislative review);
Kristin Torres, Deal OKs Welfare Drug Tests; Lawsuit Likely, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 16,
2012), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/deal-oks-welfare-drugtests-lawsuit-likely/nQS5c.
See generally Kaaryn Gustafson, Criminal Law: The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2009); see also Budd, supra note 4, at 754; Michele Estrin Gilman, The
Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1389, 1416, 1445 (2012) (noting that
“[t]he stigma of drug testing is a way to discourage the needy from seeking assistance”
and that this kind of data collection “stigmatize[s] and humiliate[s], . . . compounding
the harmful effects of living in poverty”).
See Budd, supra note 4, at 776–77 (noting “the correlation between poverty and drug addiction is quite weak” and citing various studies finding drug abuse among welfare recipients to be at or below the national level).
See Walker Newell, Tax Dollars Earmarked for Drugs? The Policy And Constitutionality of Drug
Testing Welfare Recipients, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 215, 250–51 (2011); Rachel Bloom,
Drug-Testing Welfare Recipients: A Trend With No Traction, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2012,
2:37
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rachel-bloom/drug-testing-welfare_b_
1317162.html (explaining Virginia’s decision not to pass legislation because it would cost
$1.3 million and save only $229,165 in the first year).
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997) (“To be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”).
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ed by a “special need[], beyond the normal need for law enforce18
ment.” The special needs analysis consists of a balancing test weigh19
ing individual privacy interests against government interests. Most
analyses of welfare recipient drug testing employ the special needs
doctrine and conclude that individual interests outweigh those of the
20
government, making the search unconstitutional.
However, reliance on the special needs doctrine alone overlooks
the element of consent in these cases. Laws mandating drug testing
for welfare recipients do not involve government searches of unwilling individuals, the standard Fourth Amendment situation. They instead force individuals to consent to invasive drug tests and thereby
relinquish Fourth Amendment rights. Technically, an individual
does not have to consent, and if she does not consent, no search
21
takes place. Thus, the drug tests are, at least in a formal sense, consensual searches. And, consent generally eliminates any potential
22
Fourth Amendment problem with a search.
The Court has dealt with the problem of consent as a waiver of
constitutional rights with an “unconstitutional conditions” analysis.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which originated in the
context of First Amendment government employee speech rights,
purports to “prevent[] the government from penalizing those who
exercise their constitutional rights by withholding a benefit that oth23
erwise would be available.” This would seem to apply to an individual deprived of welfare benefits for asserting a Fourth Amendment
right. So, under current doctrine, mandated drug testing for welfare
recipients should be analyzed as an unconstitutional condition, not as
an ordinary Fourth Amendment search. Unfortunately, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is incoherent, and examining it is “diso24
Though it generally announces that the government
rienting.”
cannot condition a benefit on the waiver of a constitutionally pro18
19

20
21

22
23
24

Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)).
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (“When faced with such special needs, we have not hesitated to
balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant
and probable-cause requirements in the particular context.”).
See infra notes 25 and 26 and accompanying text.
See Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, No. 11-15259, 2013 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3998, at *32 (11th Cir. Feb. 26, 2013) (“[U]nder Florida’s program, an applicant
is required to sign an acknowledgement that he or she consents to drug testing. Accordingly . . . the drug test is administered only to those persons who have consented to the
test . . . .”).
See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1972).
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 980 (3d ed. 2006).
Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (1984).
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tected right, cases do not identify or distinguish prohibited from acceptable conditions. Thus, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
ultimately fails to provide a solution.
This Comment argues for a new constitutional analysis to address
emerging welfare recipient drug testing cases under the Fourth
Amendment. Part I explains why a standard Fourth Amendment
special needs analysis does not directly apply. Part II considers the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and explains why its use is ultimately futile. Part III discusses First Amendment government employee speech cases as an example of a context in which the Court
has developed a new doctrine to address similar issues. It argues that
the Court should similarly develop a test for Fourth Amendment violations in the context of conditioned welfare benefits. The test
should consider (1) whether the policy constitutes a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, (2) how easy it is for individuals
to withhold consent, and (3) whether the search is substantially related to the effective administration of the government services, or
whether the government is merely leveraging power. This Comment
concludes that, under this substance-oriented analysis, legislation
mandating drug testing for welfare recipients violates the Fourth
Amendment.
I. THE STANDARD FOURTH AMENDMENT “SPECIAL NEEDS” ANALYSIS:
NOT DIRECTLY APPLICABLE
Courts and commentators have been directly applying standard
25
Fourth Amendment doctrine to welfare recipient drug testing cases.
They argue that mandated drug testing for welfare recipients constitutes an unreasonable search because the government cannot

25

See, e.g., Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d, Lebron v. Sec’y,
Dep’t of Children & Families, No. 11-15258, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 3998, at *44 (11th Cir.
Feb. 26, 2013); Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1135 (E.D. Mich. 2000),
rev’d, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated, 319 F.3d 258
(6th Cir. 2003), aff’d by an equally divided court, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc);
Michael D. Socha, An Analysis of Michigan’s Plan for Suspicionless Drug Testing of Welfare Recipients Under the Fourth Amendment “Special Needs” Exception, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1099 (2001);
Lindsey Lyle, Note, Florida’s Legislation Mandating Suspicionless Drug Testing of TANF Beneficiaries: The Constitutionality and Efficacy of Implementing Drug Testing Requirements on the Welfare Population, 8 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 68, 7984 (2012) (analyzing the constitutionality of
Florida’s legislation with Fourth Amendment special needs case law); Abby E. Schaberg,
Law Summary, State Drug Testing Requirements for Welfare Recipients: Are Missouri and Florida’s New Laws Constitutional?, 77 MO. L. REV. 567, 56971 (2012) (discussing application of
Fourth Amendment special needs analysis to state drug testing requirements for welfare
recipients).
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demonstrate a special need that justifies the privacy intrusion.26 For
example, in Marchwinski v. Howard, the district court applied the
Fourth Amendment special needs doctrine to find Michigan’s suspi27
cionless drug testing law unconstitutional. In so doing, however, it
ignored the issue of consent, disregarding the State’s argument about
28
“the voluntary nature of applying for welfare benefits.”
Yet many commend this court’s approach. Professor Jordan C.
Budd explains, “the district court in Marchwinski took the Constitution at its word and applied the Fourth Amendment on its conven29
tional terms to uphold the poor’s basic right to bodily autonomy.”
Budd argues that upcoming drug testing proposals offer a chance for
federal courts to follow in the footsteps of the Marchwinski district
court and redeem corrupted Fourth Amendment doctrine that has
“denied indigent litigants the full force of otherwise applicable con30
stitutional guarantees.” While this is a laudable idea, it disregards
the significance of consent and other distinguishing features in these
cases that make it difficult, if not impossible, to view mandated drug
tests for welfare recipients as standard Fourth Amendment searches.
A. Consent Is a Key Fourth Amendment Issue
Though the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits government
31
officials from performing searches without individualized suspicion,
32
an individual can waive this right. For example, if the police ask to
26

27
28

29
30
31

32

See Lebron, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1286 (“[T]he State has not demonstrated a substantial special need to justify the wholesale, suspicionless drug testing of all applicants for TANF
benefits.”); Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1142 (“[T]he State’s financial assistance to
parents for the care for their minor children . . . cannot be used to regulate the parents
in a manner that erodes their privacy rights in order to further goals that are unrelated to
the [welfare benefits].”); see generally Budd, supra note 4. But cf. Jeffrey Widelitz, Florida’s
Suspicionless Drug Testing of Welfare Applicants, 36 NOVA. L. REV. 253, 293–307 (2011) (finding Florida law constitutional under a Fourth Amendment “special needs” analysis).
Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1135.
Id. at 1143. The court compared the case to Chandler, arguing that the drug testing in
Chandler “involved an even more voluntary activity” because “[n]o one is compelled to
run for public office.” Id. The court misread Chandler because an individual has a constitutional right to run for public office. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
Budd, supra note 4, at 804.
Id. at 803.
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997) (“[T]his restraint on government conduct
generally bars officials from undertaking a search or seizure absent individualized suspicion.”).
See, e.g., Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 3998, at
*32 (11th Cir. Feb. 26, 2013) (“[A] search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitutionally permissible.”) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222
(1973)).
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look inside a random motorist’s trunk, and he says “yes,” there is no
33
Fourth Amendment problem with the search. An individual’s consent to a search removes the standard Fourth Amendment problem
34
and eliminates the need for any further analysis. This principle is
well established in the criminal context, and the Supreme Court has
endorsed it in other situations as well.
35
For example, in Wyman v. James, the Court assessed the constitutionality of a New York policy requiring home visits by caseworkers as
36
a condition of receiving public assistance. The Court held that the
recipient’s ability to decline the visit (along with the aid) cured any
Fourth Amendment problem, noting “the visitation in itself is not
forced or compelled, and . . . the beneficiary’s denial of permission is
37
not a criminal act.” It reasoned that “[i]f consent to the visitation is
withheld, no visitation takes place. The aid then never begins or
merely ceases . . . . There is no entry of the home and there is no
38
search.” The Court concluded that “[t]he choice is entirely [the in39
dividual’s], and nothing of constitutional magnitude is involved.”
40
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court similarly addressed con41
sent in the context of government benefits. In this case, the Court
assessed the constitutionality of a South Carolina policy endorsing
42
the drug testing of hospitalized women receiving obstetrical care.
The hospital and law enforcement officials were collaborating to drug
43
test women and using the results to prosecute them for child abuse.
44
The State argued that the women had consented to the drug tests.
45
However, the Fourth Circuit had not ruled on that issue. To apply
the standard Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court expressly as46
sumed that the searches were conducted without informed consent.
But ultimately, the Court remanded the case for a decision on the

33
34

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

These are the facts of Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 220.
Michelle Yoder, Drug Tests for Welfare: Saving Taxpayer Money or Flushing it Down the Drain?,
17 PUB. INT. L. REP. 56, 59 (2011) (“It is well established that a search, otherwise invalid,
will be constitutional with the appropriate consent or waiver.”).
400 U.S. 309 (1971).
Id. at 309.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 317–18.
Id. at 324.
532 U.S. 67 (2001).
Id. at 73–76.
Id. at 71–73.
Id.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 76.
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consent issue.47 It reasoned that “when [hospitals] undertake to obtain such evidence from their patients for the specific purpose of incriminating those patients, they have a special obligation to make
sure that the patients are fully informed about their constitutional
48
rights, as standards of knowing waiver require.” Consent was the
decisive factor. The holding implied that, with informed consent,
there would not have been a Fourth Amendment problem, and the
49
drug tests would have been constitutional.
Wyman and Ferguson indicate that mandated drug testing policies
for welfare recipients can avoid or survive direct Fourth Amendment
scrutiny because of the recipients’ consent. Like in Wyman, an individual may choose not to consent to the drug test, and then, no drug
test would take place. As in Ferguson, an individual’s informed consent would suggest that waiver is possible. Thus, the consent involved
removes any direct Fourth Amendment problem with welfare drug
testing policies.
B. Consent is Immaterial in Many Special Needs Cases for Other Reasons
Though consent generally eliminates the Fourth Amendment
problem, the Court has applied a standard Fourth Amendment analysis in some cases that do arguably feature consent. However, these
cases are all distinguishable from welfare drug testing cases on
grounds that make consent immaterial.
1. Cases Involving Government Employees or Public Schoolchildren
With government employees (who can choose not to work for the
government) and schoolchildren (who can choose not to participate
in extracurricular activities), the Court has not considered consent an
important factor. However, the Court did not focus on consent in
these cases because the government won even under the nonconsensual Fourth Amendment standard, making the question of consent
50
irrelevant.

47
48
49

50

Id. On remand, the Fourth Circuit found the government had not obtained constitutionally valid consent. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 308 F.3d 380, 404 (4th Cir. 2002).
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85 (emphasis omitted).
The problem is that a woman has little choice but to consent to such a search when
threatened with the denial of medical care. This is the same problem that affects welfare
recipients when policies place drug testing conditions on the receipt of public assistance.
Cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59–60
(2006) (finding it unnecessary to consider the unconstitutional conditions doctrine because the government could simply impose the condition at issue without consent).
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Both Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association51 and National
52
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab involved government-mandated
drug testing for government employees. In Skinner, the Court held
that federal regulations mandating drug tests for railroad employees
53
were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It reasoned that
“[e]mployees subject to the tests discharge duties fraught
with . . . risks of injury to others that . . . can have disastrous conse54
quences.” Likewise, in Von Raab, the Court held that a program requiring suspicionless drug testing for certain United States Customs
55
Service employees was constitutional. It reasoned that these employees were the “first line of defense against [drug smuggling that
56
affects] the health and welfare” of the country. It also reasoned that
“successful performance of their duties depends uniquely on their
57
judgment and dexterity.” Thus, in both Skinner and Von Raab, the
58
Because the
Court emphasized the importance of public safety.
government employees had duties related to public safety, their consent, or lack thereof, did not matter.
59
Similarly, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Court upheld
a school district’s policy to drug test student athletes without individ60
It explained that “Fourth Amendment
ualized suspicion.
61
The
rights . . . are different in public schools than elsewhere.”
Court stressed schools’ “special responsibility of care and direction”
for children, and reasoned that “the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government’s responsibilities . . . as guardian and tu62
tor of children entrusted to its care.” The Court went even further
63
in Board of Education v. Earls, upholding a school district’s policy of
drug testing all students who participated in any extracurricular activ64
ity. Relying on Vernonia, it “considered the constitutionality of the
program in the context of the public school’s custodial responsibili-

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

489 U.S. 602 (1989).
489 U.S. 656 (1989).
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634.
Id. at 628.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 672.
Id. at 677; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
Id. at 650, 665.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 662, 665.
536 U.S. 822 (2002).
Id. at 826, 838.
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ties.”65 Because of a public school’s role “in loco parentis,” a student’s
66
consent or lack thereof was inconsequential.
Cases involving government mandated drug testing for welfare recipients are different because, as most courts and commentators
agree, in this context, a nonconsensual search without individualized
67
suspicion is likely unconstitutional. And, welfare recipients should
not be compared to government employees or schoolchildren. Unlike government employees, welfare recipients have no duty to the
public, and the act of receiving public assistance does not make recipients responsible for public safety in any way. Relegating welfare recipients to the same status as schoolchildren is oppressive and demeaning. The government has no more responsibility to care for
welfare recipients than it does to care for the general public. Yet, it is
beyond question that the government cannot randomly drug test the
general public to patrol drug use. Because drug testing welfare recipients has nothing to do with ensuring public safety or parenting
schoolchildren, the policy cannot survive a standard Fourth Amendment special needs analysis regardless of any element of consent.
2. Policies Forcing Choice Between Constitutional Rights
68
In the one civil search case that the government has lost, the
Court also applied the Fourth Amendment special needs analysis directly, without considering consent. In Chandler v. Miller, the Court
struck down a Georgia statute requiring drug testing for candidates
69
running for state offices. However, this case is distinguishable from
other Fourth Amendment special needs cases because there is a con70
stitutional right to run for public office. Thus, with its drug testing
policy, the state effectively asked citizens to choose between two con71
stitutional rights. This invalidated any consent.

65
66
67
68

69
70

71

Id. at 838.
See Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995).
See supra note 26.
See Fabio Arcila, Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference: Suspicionless Civil Searches in the Modern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1223, 1229 (2004) (describing the Court’s recent
suspicionless civil search cases).
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
See generally Anderson v. Calabrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 783, 806 (1983) (holding a state restriction on running for public office unduly burdened voters’ freedoms of choice and association under the First Amendment).
The government cannot require citizens to surrender a constitutional right simply by offering them the alternative of surrendering a different one. Cf. New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (finding that Congress cannot offer states a choice of two
alternatives, neither of which it could impose as a freestanding requirement).
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Here again, mandated drug testing for welfare recipients is differ72
ent, for there is no constitutional right to welfare. Asking citizens to
take a drug test or give up welfare does not require them to compromise one constitutional right at the expense of another. The Court’s
use of a standard Fourth Amendment special needs analysis in Chandler does not indiciate that such analysis is appropriate for welfare
drug testing cases.
II. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE: NOT A VIABLE
SOLUTION
The Supreme Court has dealt with the problem of conditional infringements on constitutional rights before, using what is known as
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine stands for the proposition that “the government
[cannot] condition a benefit on the requirement that a person fore73
go a constitutional right.” The Court has used this doctrine in several different contexts, mostly involving First Amendment rights. For
example, the Court has held that the government cannot condition a
tax exemption on the requirement that a person disavow his belief in
74
overthrowing the federal government. It has also held that the government cannot condition unemployment benefits on a person’s will75
ingness to violate her religious principles. Thus, under current law,
one would most naturally challenge a government policy conditioning the receipt of welfare benefits on a clean drug test under the un76
constitutional conditions doctrine.
72

73

74
75
76

See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484, 486–87 (1970) (noting that welfare is not a
“freedom[] guaranteed by the Bill of Rights” in upholding a state policy limiting amounts
of public assistance).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at 570. There is a vast amount of scholarship on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. For the leading work on the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413
(1989).
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518–19, 528–29 (1958).
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404–06 (1963).
Cf. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions and Welfare,
72 DENV. U. L. REV. 931, 934–35 (1995) (“It is clear at the outset that contraceptive welfare laws present an unconstitutional conditions problem. They raise the classic unconstitutional conditions question whether the government may condition the conferral of
welfare benefits on the beneficiary’s surrender of her constitutional right to reproductive
autonomy and bodily integrity, although the government might choose not to provide
welfare benefits altogether. The government is plainly doing indirectly what it could not
do directly.”)
Many scholars discussed conditions on welfare in the context of unconstitutional
conditions pre-Marchwinski. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Bargaining for Public Assistance, 72
DENV. U. L. REV. 949, 950–51 (1995) (discussing author’s theory that the Court uses a
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Accordingly, the district court in Lebron, the Florida case, looked
77
to this doctrine to dispose of the issue of consent. The court offered a blanket assertion that “the State’s exaction of consent to an
otherwise unconstitutional search in exchange for [welfare] benefits
78
The
would violate the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.”
79
Eleventh Circuit court majority agreed. But, as Judge Jordan’s con80
currence hinted, this claim is much too broad. Unfortunately, case
law does not consistently distinguish between those conditions that
are prohibited and those that are reasonable.
In theory, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine should provide a test to determine when the government can place conditions
on the benefits it grants and require people to agree to something it
could not otherwise require. However, the doctrine is a conceptual
failure, so it is not actually helpful. Commentators have been unable
to reconcile the many cases that invoke the doctrine or to develop a
81
cohesive framework for understanding it.
In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., the
Supreme Court itself suggested that the doctrine is invoked or ig-

77
78
79
80
81

two-pronged test to decide unconstitutional conditions cases involving welfare benefits);
Philippa M. Guthrie, Drug Testing and Welfare: Taking the Drug War to Unconstitutional Limits?, 66 IND. L.J. 579, 592, 598–602 (1991) (discussing three types of claims available to
welfare recipients challenging a drug testing program, including an unconstitutional
conditions claim).
Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1284 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
Id.
Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 3998 at *40–43
(11th Cir. Feb. 26, 2013).
Id. at *49–51 (Jordan, J., concurring).
See id. at *49 (Jordan, J., concurring) (“In my view the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is somewhat incoherent, and some of the cases decided under it are difficult to reconcile.”); Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 1013 (“[T]he cases cannot be reconciled . . . . If
the Court wishes to strike down a condition, it declares it to be an unconstitutional condition; if the Court wishes to uphold a condition, it declares that the government is making
a permissible choice to subsidize some activities and not others.”); see also RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 17–24 (1993) (discussing the lack of desirable large
patterns in the unconstitutional conditions cases); Baker, supra note 72, at 968–69 (concluding that it is “hard to know” which of two theories addressing the unconstitutional
conditions “paradox” is “right”); Julie A. Nice, Making Conditions Constitutional by Attaching
Them to Welfare: The Dangers of Selective Contextual Ignorance of the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 971, 971 (1995) (discussing frustration with the “lack of a
consensus identifying a coherent theoretical framework underlying the [unconstitutional
conditions] doctrine”); Jonathan Romberg, Is There a Doctrine in the House? Welfare Reform
and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 22 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1051, 1053 (1995)
(“The Court . . . has made no serious attempt to clarify its divergent approach to unconstitutional conditions cases. Numerous commentators have attempted to do so, but no
consensus has emerged.”).
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nored on an unpredictable and seemingly arbitrary basis.82 It identified two conflicting rules: (1) the government “is free to attach reasonable and unambiguous conditions to . . . financial assistance that
[recipients] are not obligated to accept,” and (2) “the government
may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . [right] even if he has no entitlement to that
83
benefit.” Either of these principles would decide a case if it were the
only principle that applied. The problem is that both principles apply—or, both might. The Court has not provided a consistent way to
84
determine which principle applies in any given case.
Ultimately, Professors William Marshall and Cass Sunstein may be
right to suggest that there is not, and should not be, a theory of un85
Marshall writes that “the search for a
constitutional conditions.
comprehensive theory of unconstitutional conditions is ultimately fu86
tile.” He concludes that “whether a governmentally imposed condition upon the receipt of a benefit is unconstitutional depends upon
87
the definition of the particular constitutional protection involved.”
Similarly, Sunstein argues that the unconstitutional conditions doc88
trine is an “anachronism” that “should be abandoned.” Instead, he
contends, “what is necessary is a highly particular, constitutionallycentered model of reasons: an approach that asks whether, under
the provision at issue, the government has constitutionally sufficient
89
justifications for affecting constitutionally protected interests.”
Thus, for cases that invoke the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
an analysis should consider the substance of the right at issue and the
context of the potential violation.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPROACH
Because the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has failed to address effectively the surrender of constitutional rights across varying
substantive areas of the law, the Court needs to develop an alternative
82
83
84
85

86
87
88
89

547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Sullivan, supra note 73, at 1416–17 (providing numerous examples of how “the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is riven with inconsistencies”).
William P. Marshall, Towards a Nonunifying Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions: The Example of the Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 243, 244 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Why
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion,
Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 594–95 (1990).
Marshall, supra note 85, at 244.
Id.
Sunstein, supra note 85, at 594.
Id. at 595.

1552

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:5

approach to decide Fourth Amendment violations in the context of
conditioned welfare benefits. In comparable situations, the Court
has moved away from the idea of a generic unconstitutional conditions doctrine toward a more substantive analysis. For example, in
First Amendment government employee speech rights cases, the
Court formally developed a context-specific doctrine, known as the
90
First Amendment government employee
Connick-Pickering test.
speech cases and Fourth Amendment welfare recipient drug testing
cases share similar features: both involve an element of consent and
government non-sovereign (civil), as opposed to sovereign (criminal), action. Using the First Amendment cases as an example, the
Court should develop a special test for Fourth Amendment issues
pertaining to welfare benefits that considers both the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment and the government’s needs as a benefit provider.
A. A Valuable Example: The Approach to First Amendment Violations in the
Context of Government Employee Speech
Cases addressing government employee speech rights under the
First Amendment once presented a problem very similar to that of
welfare drug testing cases. Under standard First Amendment doctrine, the government cannot penalize individuals for the content of
91
their speech without meeting strict scrutiny. However, speech in the
context of government employment presents a unique situation. Individuals are not entitled to government employment, and ordinary
First Amendment analysis would prevent the government from managing the workplace and disciplining disruptive workers. Also, the
government imposes sanctions as an employer in a non-sovereign capacity (i.e., it fires employees as opposed to arresting them).
Recognizing these aspects of government employee speech rights
92
cases, the Court started using a waiver theory and unconstitutional
93
conditions analysis. Then, it realized that adopting a waiver theory
90

91

92

93

The test comes from Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983). For a more detailed discussion, see infra note 95 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“If a statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling
governmental interest.”).
See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (“[A policeman]
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman.”).
See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[E]ven though a person has no
‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny
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would allow the government to silence public employees seeking to
94
speak as citizens. And, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, offering an unpredictable choice between that and the alternative, restricting the government’s supervision of its employees, was not a
good solution. Hence, the Court abandoned that approach and
crafted a special First Amendment analysis tailored to address the
specific features of government employee speech.
The Connick-Pickering test, derived from two Supreme Court cas95
es, considers (1) whether the adverse employment action was motivated by the employee’s speech, (2) whether the speech was about a
matter of public concern, and (3) a balancing of the employee’s
speech rights against the employer’s interest in the efficient function96
ing of the office. These considerations help ensure that government employees have adequate speech protection even though em97
ployment is technically voluntary. In other words, the test prevents
the government from leveraging the employer-employee relationship
98
to infringe inappropriately on employees’ rights to free speech. It
provides a context-sensitive analysis taking into account the purposes
of the First Amendment and the special needs of the government as
an employer.
Like public employee speech cases, welfare recipient drug testing
cases feature consent and non-sovereign government action. The
Court has already recognized the significance of these features in the
Fourth Amendment context. In addition to identifying consent as an
99
important consideration, the Court examines the form of govern-

94

95
96
97
98

99

him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected interests . . . .”).
See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, The Costs of Agencies: Waters v. Churchhill and the First
Amendment in the Administrative State, 106 YALE L.J. 1233 (1997) (discussing public employee speech rights).
See supra note 90.
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2008).
Id. at 418–19.
Id. at 419. By leveraging, the Court seems to mean the government’s exploitation of a
pre-existing relationship to acquire power over individuals in an unrelated context. See
id. (“The First Amendment limits the ability of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to restrict, incidentally or intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizents.”); Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as You Think:
Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes Sense, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 643 (2012) (providing examples of what may constitute leveraging). The anti-leveraging principle is presumably
what the unconstitutional conditions doctrine tries to enforce; it just has not found a coherent way to do so.
See discussion supra Part I.A.
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ment action in the special needs analysis.100 Just as it did in the First
Amendment context, the Court should formalize an approach to
Fourth Amendment cases with these characteristics. For cases challenging conditions on welfare under the Fourth Amendment, the
Court needs a test that considers both the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment and the Government’s needs as a benefit provider, yet
prevents the government from leveraging the government-beneficiary
relationship.
B. Proposed Analysis for Fourth Amendment Violations in the Context of
Conditioned Welfare Benefits
For cases challenging conditions on welfare benefits under the
Fourth Amendment, the Court should use a three-prong test that
considers the search, the consent (or lack thereof), and the government’s needs concerning the administration of public assistance.
The Court should first consider whether the condition constitutes a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. If the condition does not qualify as a search, the analysis would stop, as there
would be no Fourth Amendment violation. If it is a search, the Court
should consider how harmful it is in terms of the values and purposes
of the Fourth Amendment.
Second, the Court should consider how easy it is for the individual
to withhold consent. If the government benefit is trivial or nonessential, then less judicial protection is needed. However, if the benefit is
critical to the life and wellbeing of the individual, more judicial protection is needed.
Finally, the Court should consider whether the search is substantially related to the effective administration of the government ser100

See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Individuals generally receive greater Fourth
Amendment protection against the government in its non-sovereign capacity. Compare,
e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 80, 83–84 (2001) (emphasizing the government’s sovereign action, referring to it as a critical distinction, and striking down the
government policy to give the women full Fourth Amendment protection), with Nat’l
Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 664, 666 (1989) (noting that the “drugtesting program is not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement” in upholding the government’s policy), and Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318, 322–23, 326
(1971) (upholding the government’s home visit policy, reasoning that the “[t]he visit is
not one by police or uniformed authority,” that prosecution is not the primary objective
of the visit, and that “[i]t does not deal with crime or with the actual or suspected perpetrators of crime”). Since providing public assistance is a non-sovereign government action, welfare recipients risk receiving inadequate Fourth Amendment protection. They
need substantial protection because of both the nature of the violated right and the type
of benefit at issue. See discussion infra Part III.C.1–2.
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vices, or whether the government is, instead, just leveraging power.
This prong of the test takes into account the government’s need to
ensure that benefits are properly distributed but also protects individuals from the inappropriate use of government power. The government is “leveraging” if it is opportunistically using an individual’s
dependence on government benefits to obtain power over an unrelated area of that individual’s life. Lack of a clear connection between the condition imposed and the requirements of program administration suggests leveraging because it indicates that the
government is taking advantage of individuals’ needs to achieve some
unrelated objective. Governmental use of sovereign power also suggests that the government is leveraging, because there is no need to
use law enforcement to implement welfare programs. If the Court
determines that the condition is just a means for the government to
leverage power, it should find a violation of the individual’s Fourth
Amendment protection.
C. Government Mandated Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients Violates the
Fourth Amendment
Under the above test, laws mandating drug testing for welfare recipients violate individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights. Drug tests are
clearly searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, consent is extremely difficult for welfare recipients to withhold, and the
tests are not substantially related to the effective administration of the
benefits. The government is leveraging power over the poor and
should not be permitted to do so.
1. Drug Tests Are Searches
The Court has held repeatedly that drug tests constitute searches
101
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Drug tests are ex102
tremely invasive, much more so than home visits by social workers.
They involve collecting bodily fluids, requiring that a sample of blood
or urine be extracted or excreted from the body. These fluids contain the most personal of information, DNA. Thus, these tests not
only infringe upon a person’s bodily dignity, but also deprive people
of control over personal, highly sensitive information. This is exactly
101

102

See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 76 (2001) (holding that urinalysis drug testing constitutes a
Fourth Amendment “search”) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602,
617 (1989)).
Cf. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 317–18, 326 (1971) (stressing the “rehabilitative,” “investigative,”
and “interview nature” of home visits in concluding that such visits were not invasive).
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the kind of harmful intrusion the Fourth Amendment intends to
prohibit.
2. Consent Is Hard to Withhold
The stakes of withholding consent are particularly high in the welfare context, signaling the need for more judicial protection. While
people subject to drug testing conditions may technically choose not
to consent, they do so at the expense of meeting their basic daily
needs, as welfare benefits provide subsistence. Thus, the costs of
withholding consent in this situation and losing welfare benefits are
much higher than the costs of withholding consent in other contexts.
If a government employee does not consent, she may lose her job and
have to work elsewhere. If a student does not consent, she may not
be able to play on the school soccer team. But, if a welfare recipient
does not consent, she may not be able to eat, clothe, or shelter herself or her dependents. Forcing surrender of Fourth Amendment
rights as a condition of welfare is also particularly troubling since wel103
fare is supposed to promote independence, not reduce dignity.
Since welfare is intended to benefit the entire family unit, children are unduly affected. Dependent children are powerless with regard to a parent’s decision to withhold consent. If a parent, for
whatever reason, cannot or will not consent to the drug test, innocent
children do not receive benefits intended to provide for their basic
104
This potential harm to children also makes withholding
needs.
consent more difficult: parents willing to go without benefits rather
than submit to drug tests might reconsider if their children will suffer
as well.

103

104

See Gilman, supra note 14, at 1405 (“[A]ccepting welfare can subject one to humiliation,
but refusing it can result in hunger. This ‘choice’ hardly promotes autonomy or dignity.”). As Professor Sullivan points out, this type of condition “discriminates de facto between those who do and do not depend on a government benefit, [and] it can create an
undesirable caste hierarchy in the enjoyment of constitutional rights.” Sullivan, supra
note 66, at 1490. She explains, “background inequalities of wealth and resources necessarily determine one’s bargaining position in relation to government, and . . . the poor
may have nothing to trade but their liberties.” Id. at 1497–98; see also Roberts, supra note
76, at 941–43 (arguing that “[a]n individual’s acceptance of government benefits is
[wrongfully] deemed to constitute a waiver of privacy,” whereas “[w]ealth can help to buy
the presumption of privacy”).
It should be clear that the state has no interest in punishing children for their parents’
misdeeds, much less their parents’ decision to waive a constitutional right. Cf. Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that children cannot be disfavored based on their
parents’ immigration status).
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Moreover, the consent involved in welfare drug testing cases is not
105
It is ofnecessarily informed consent, as required under Ferguson.
ten unclear under state legislation what the government can or will
106
do with the information from the drug tests. Under TANF, federal
107
law authorizes states to sanction individuals who test positive. This
potential exercise of sovereign government power further demonstrates the need for increased judicial protection from the drug test108
ing policies.
3. The Search Is Not Related to Administering Benefits; Government Is
Leveraging Power
The drug tests are not substantially related to the effective administration of welfare benefits. Nothing is required of welfare recipients. Unlike government employees, welfare recipients are not performing government job functions, nor are they responsible for
public safety. The government’s primary concern in distributing welfare benefits is ensuring that the money goes to the correct qualified
109
110
individuals. Drug tests do not help it further this purpose.

105

106

107
108
109

Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85 (2001) (“While state hospital employees . . . may have a duty to provide the police with evidence of criminal conduct that they
inadvertently acquire in the course of routine treatment, when they undertake to obtain
such evidence from their patients for the specific purpose of incriminating those patients,
they have a special obligation to make sure that the patients are fully informed about
their constitutional rights . . . .”(emphasis omitted)). Informed consent in the welfare
context could be achieved through a policy providing an additional monetary incentive
for welfare recipients who agree to be tested and test negative.
Many of the laws leave open the possibility of criminal sanctions. See Lebron v. Wilkins,
820 F. Supp. 2d. 1273, 1280 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (explaining that the welfare agency shares
all positive drug tests with a hotline that is authorized to share its records with criminal
justice agencies and state attorneys).
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See supra note 100.
Wyman shows that the Government can ensure that welfare funds are going to the proper
recipients. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 322 (1971). Home visits are related to the
provision of services that affect dependent children, who are objects of public concern.
See id. However, unlike a social worker’s observation of a home, drug tests reveal little
about whether funds have gone to dependent children. Marchwinski v. Howard warns of
the danger of accepting this argument:
If the State is allowed to drug test [welfare] recipients in order to ameliorate child
abuse and neglect by virtue of its financial assistance on behalf of minor children,
that excuse could be used for testing the parents of all children who receive Medicaid, State Emergency Relief, educational grants or loans, public education or any
other benefit from the State. In all cases in which the State offers a benefit on behalf of minor children, the State could claim that it has a broad interest in the care
of those children which overcomes the privacy rights of the parents.
113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1142 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
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The government also has an interest in ensuring that the money it
provides is used for its intended purpose and not to purchase drugs.
However, the government provides monetary benefits to many citi111
For example, the govzens without attempting to drug test them.
112
Also,
ernment does not drug test citizens receiving tax benefits.
there is no general principle honored in different contexts that the
government needs to ensure that taxpayer dollars are not funding
drug use. For example, the government does not drug test legisla113
tors, whose salaries are paid by taxpayers. There is no reason that
the government’s interest in not funding drug use is greater in the
welfare context than in any other context. Studies have shown that
the rate of drug use among welfare recipients is lower than that of the
114
general population. Thus, with policies requiring drug testing for

110

111

112

113

114

The government cannot argue that drug tests help it ensure funds are distributed to dependent children because tests are conducted before any funds have been distributed.
See Lebron, 820 F. Supp. 2d. at 1273 (“At the point at which the drug test is demanded, the
State has not made a TANF contribution for the benefit of the children.”).
See Gilman, supra note 14, at 1391 (“[M]ost government benefits do not flow to the poor,
yet this is the group we require to sacrifice their dignity and their right to privacy.” (internal quotation omitted)).
The government gives out billions of dollars of what some have referred to as “corporate
welfare,” yet it does not drug test CEOs on Wall Street. Some bloggers have advanced this
idea.
See Eric Baerren, The Latest Dumb Idea:
Drug Testing People on Welfare,
MICHIGANLIBERAL.COM (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.michiganliberal.com/diary/18702/
the-latest-dumb-idea-drug-testing-people-on-welfare (“Perhaps it is time to subject investment bankers and derivatives traders to routine random drug tests . . . . The health of the
economy is too important to be left in the hands of potentially drug-addled brains.”).
The reaction to such a suggestion is one of incredulity. See The Daily Show with Jon Stewart:
Poor Pee-Ple (Comedy Central television broadcast Feb. 2, 2012), available at
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-february-2-2012/poor-pee-ple.
See Associated Press, Florida: Few Drug Users Among Welfare Applicants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2011, at A14 (“Preliminary figures compiled under a new state law requiring drug tests for
welfare applicants show that they are less likely than other people to use drugs, not
more.”). Compare Maia Szalavitz, Does Drug Testing the Poor Do Anything to Reduce Addiction?,
TIME HEALTH & FAMILY, Aug. 30, 2011, http://healthland.time.com/2011/08/30/doesdrug-testing-the-poor-do-anything-to-reduce-addiction (“One study found that just 4% of
people receiving welfare were addicted to illegal drugs.”), with Associated Press, supra
(“The Justice Department estimates that 6 percent of Americans 12 and older use illegal
drugs.”). See also Cohen, supra note 7 (“Several studies, including a 1996 report from the
National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, have found that there is no significant difference in the rate of illegal-drug use by welfare applicants and other people.
Another study found that 70% of illegal-drug users between the age of 18 and 49 are employed full time.”). In Lebron, the court explained that “researchers found a lower rate of
drug usage among TANF applicants than among current estimates of the population of
Florida as a whole. This would suggest that TANF funds are no more likely to be diverted
to drug use or used in a manner that would expose children to drugs or fund the ‘drug
epidemic’ than funds provided to any other recipient of government benefits.” Lebron v.
Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d. 1273, 1286 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
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welfare recipients, the government is leveraging power over the poor
that it cannot wield over other citizen populations.
Furthermore, drug testing does not help the government with its
115
There is no data
goal of moving recipients from welfare to work.
that suggests that drug use among welfare recipients prevents them
116
from getting jobs. This means that there is no evidence that drug
testing policies help advance the goal of decreasing dependency on
public assistance in any way. On the other hand, the current high
unemployment rate reflects the struggling economy and the difficulty
117
of finding jobs for all citizens. Welfare recipient drug testing policies represent the government’s attempt to cut back in times of eco118
The Fourth
nomic recession by leveraging power over the poor.
Amendment was meant to protect individuals from this kind of unreasonable government intrusion.
CONCLUSION
Emerging legislation mandating drug testing for welfare recipients stereotypes and criminalizes the poor. It strips them of their
dignity and control over their most personal information. However,
because there is an element of consent involved with the testing, policies cannot be analyzed directly under the standard Fourth Amendment special needs doctrine. Therefore, it is critical for the Court to
recognize an alternative Fourth Amendment analysis that accounts
for specific issues pertaining to conditions placed on welfare benefits.
This can put a stop to unjustifiable coercion that forces individuals to
choose between sustenance and privacy.

115

116

117

118

See 820 F. Supp. 2d. at 1286 (noting the government’s interest in “ensuring that funds are
not used in a manner that detracts from the goal of getting beneficiaries back to employment”).
See, e.g., id. (“The researchers . . . found no evidence that TANF recipients who screened
and tested positive for the use of illicit substances were any less likely to find work than
those who screened and tested negative.”); see also Cohen, supra note 7 (“Another study
found that 70% of illegal-drug users between ages 18 and 49 are employed full-time.”).
Unemployment is currently around 8%. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unemployent
Rate—Seasonally
Adjusted,
available
at
http://www.google.com/publicdata/
explore?ds=z1ebjpgk2654c1_&met_y=unemployment_rate&tdim=true&fdim_
y=seasonality:S&dl=en&hl=en&q=current+unemployment+rate (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
See Gilman, supra note 14 at 1416–17 (“The stigma of drug testing is a way to discourage
the needy from seeking assistance. It diverts the attention away from systemic problems
underlying the modern economy and . . . allows the government to wash its hands of
need.”). Yet, policies have not resulted in any government savings, have “snared few drug
users,” and have “had no effect on the number of [welfare] applications.” Lizette Alvarez,
No Savings Are Found from Welfare Drug Tests, N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 2012, at A14.

